1: Garnett B-4, 5 (ca. 1880) 1891
MA11 Kurd MA11

The affair got wind, and it was everywhere reported that Sâtir of Begirîv had found a treasure. The news finally reached the ears of the Pasha of Van, who sent for him and shut him up in the city prison, where he lay some time. He confessed the truth, and obtained his liberty only at the price of a quantity of gold, which he gave to the Pasha of Van. In short, Sâtir had to scatter his gold in all directions. 539

Sensible folks will, perhaps, doubt the truth of this story. It is, however, firmly believed in these districts, and often related, and, what is more, the descendants of Sâtir still live at Begirîv in great prosperity. They have lands, mills, many a yoke of oxen and fine flocks, and they keep open house. One might say that it is a *tekkeh*,[1] for every one receives hospitality in this Armenian house; Moslems even are never repulsed, but welcomed with every mark of attention. From that time Sâtir became well known among the Kûrds, who made great friends with him, and brought him presents of sheep. It sometimes happens that they are at feud with the inhabitants of Begirîv, and commit robberies and depredations in that town, but they always spare the house of Sâtir, saying that it is as sacred as a *tekkeh*, and that not even an indiscreet glance must enter it. [577 628 778]

The following curious story has been preserved by the late Mr. Rich,[2] who took it down literally from the lips of the narrator, a tribesman of the Bebbehs of Darishmana, without, as he says, adding to or 538 114

[1] Dervish monastery, where hospitality is generally exercised.
[2] *Narrative, &c.*, vol. i. p. 291.

against this people and, in many instances, their ignorance 114
or mendacity. This may be seen from one of the more recent
examples:

> Some of them are farmers and shepherds, but most [181]
> of them are robbers. If a Kurd has not killed six
> or seven men, he is not respected and considered
> unworthy to live. My father once told me a story
> he heard from one of the Kurdish chiefs. He said he
> had a son who was very bashful, and this was con-
> sidered quite a disgrace, for one of these chiefs
> is always made leader in case of war. It would also
> be impossible for him to marry one of the best girls
> unless he was a successful thief and robber. He
> carries with him a gun and a sword, and no matter
> how bloody or evil the deed he commits may be, it
> only adds respect and honor to his name.[1]

The sanguine reputation is not wholly without reason. In 579
other times the Kurdish chieftains were not above plundering
expeditions from their mountains and in recent years have
proven incorrigible revolutionists, for reasons which will be 669
considered in this study. This has not endeared them to 648
their co-religionists among the Arabs, Iranians, and Turks.
Secondly, many Kurds served in the Hamidiye, the irregular 702
bodies of reactionary troops organized by the Sultan 'Abd 648
al-Hamid to crush incipient liberal and nationalistic move-
ments in the tottering Ottoman Empire, and the Armenians
and other Christians who suffered from their depredations,
as well as missionaries and spokesmen in Europe, have been
loud in their denunciation of the Kurdish nation as a whole. 579
Lastly, the blood feud and brigandage are well known in [628]
Kurdistan itself. The first is not concerned with outsiders,
but acts to emphasize a bloodthirsty reputation, and the

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[1]Soane, 1913, p. 193.

notchir and hillmen from remote villages--sworn in on a cloth-covered Quran for their long-winded depositions. In the event that a chieftain has appeared, usually to palliate any offense which may have taken place within his grounds or to vouch for a suspect, the little chaykhana or tea-shop across from the government building is full of his body-guards, and a current of excitement runs through the town.

Those tribes having connections in the Rowanduz district, while not necessarily confined to it, include the Balaki under Mulla Musa Agha, the Baradost under Mahmud Beg Khalifa Ismail, the Harki under Fatah Agha, the Harruti under Hajji Huway Agha, the Khaylani under Salim Agha, the Mansal under Mahammad Sayidi, the Sarhati under Fatah Agha, and the Surchi under Kadhir Agha. The most important and numerous are the Balaki, the Baradost, the Harki, and the Surchi. Most of these have a network of lesser divisions, corresponding usually to lesser chieftains. It will be seen later that a chieftain need have no connection with a tribe to enjoy the rank. There are, to be sure, two views of the canon of tribes and their leaders, that of the government and that of the local inhabitants. The list given here is that officially furnished by the qadha of Rowanduz, and does not necessarily correspond with some segments of local opinion, for, on the one hand, certain "lawful" chieftains may be exiled, imprisoned, or unrecognized, while others, such as As'ad Agha who keeps to a well-guarded house in Rowanduz, are unable to return to their villages because of a feud.

distinction for robbery and bloodshed, and certainly a part of the usual income of the old chieftains was derived from the exaction of "talla" or outright kidnapping, either of persons or of goods, just as revenge in a blood feud was one of their outstanding duties. The introduction of better roads and the adoption of modern equipment by police and army have, without question, lessened greatly the frequency of these things, and the contemporary brigand --they still occur--finds himself heavily outgunned. In spite of this unsavory reputation, particularly for revolt, the Kurdish minority of Iraq cannot be said to be the most lawless in the country, for the Muntafiq liwa, a "Marsh Arab" province, is frequently cited as the worst. Although the army may be called upon in exceptional cases, normally the prevention and detection of crime is the work of the police, and their direction within the qaḍa is charged to the qaimmaqam.

181 579 [628] [177] [491] [625] [784] 625 647 624

Service with the police is quite popular among the poorest classes, particularly among those of the "Marsh Arab" provinces, because, although the pay is extremely small, it is accepted as a substitute for military service and, as a career, offers an escape from agricultural drudgery. Officers are attracted to serve just as they might be to the army or the civil service, and are commissioned after graduation from a special school. They are usually derived from poorer middle-class families and have had a secondary education. There is thus quite a social gap between an officer

625

husbands, and welcome a respite of a few weeks. To give an example, Ghafir Effendi owns extensive village lands and is well known to his tenants. Throughout the year persons, for a variety of reasons, appear at his house in Rowanduz to take service for a short time and then to return to their villages. Lali Khan always has ten or fifteen such retainers, many of them women. "It would be a grave mistake to call Lali Khan's people servants," one was told, "because it would bring the whole House of Isma'il Beg after one as an insult. You see that she dresses them up in fine clothing and covers the women with gold." Of such retainers, it remains to mention those who serve as bodyguards (ghulam, from Arabic, "servant," sometimes khidmetgar). Just as barbarian Germanic chieftains in ancient times had the practice of surrounding themselves with bands of warrior "companions," the Kurdish chieftain attracts a following, varying in size with his wealth and importance, who are accorded the same treatment as retainers, save that they are armed and usually exempted from menial tasks. They are typically young men, impatient with village life and desirous of the prestige that surrounds an armed guard, and form a formidable group, those who carry out the work and sustain most of the casualties of the vendetta. There are a dozen or so resident in Rowanduz. The House of Isma'il Beg has a number, that of Sadiq Agha and his brother As'ad Agha several, and Karim Agha, son of the imprisoned Nuri Dewil Agha, only one. Except in degree of permanence, there is no particular

noted for his piety, but it not only connotes chieftainship, in the sense of the Arabs, but also has a religious meaning. Certain Kurdish chieftains, shaykhs, were supposed to have an almost magical quality in their persons, and, for example, could cure ailments by the laying on of hands. In general, each son takes the title of his father, thus Rashid Agha of Jindian is the son of Muhammad 'Ali Agha, and all of his brothers have the same distinction. As far as hierarchy is concerned, beg, as in Mahmud Beg of the Baradost tribe, appears to have greater weight than agha, but there is no definite system. The investigator suspects, in view of some of the confusion in this regard, that titles are given very much as proper names at the time of birth. On the other hand, commoners never use them, even as names, and noblewomen have no such designations, although words such as amire, "princess," or shaq, "chieftain," may appear in their appellations.

The chieftain, to a large extent, is the symbol of his people's honor, tribesmen or tenants, and this is a matter of supreme importance to both Arab and Kurd. Honor has a large number of aspects of which the most important are the obligation of vengeance, safeguard and sanctuary, the integrity of women, and hospitality. If a man has been murdered, it is incumbent on his relatives to avenge his death, and this is the beginning of the vendetta or blood-feud. The peaceful solution is the payment of hekelkhwin or blood-money, an amount calculated in goods or cash, but

565 554 [756] [551] 622 628

usually there is speedy recourse to arms and a vendetta can extend over decades and count scores of victims. In the case of commoners, the chieftains of the people involved often intervene, and sometimes pay the bedalkhwin from their own purses, but, failing this, they are expected to aid in obtaining revenge. In the case of aristocratic households, the matter is not settled so easily, although, in rare situations, a third neutral party, a great chieftain known for his piety and justice, may be asked to arbitrate. The most famous feud of the district was that between the Houses of Isma'il Beg and Muri Rawil Agha, beginning in the days of the first World War, temporarily at an end with the murder of the former and the life imprisonment of the latter. There were many casualties on both sides, and several of the participants are still in prison, such as Isma'il Beg's bailiff, and the two uncles of his mother, Lali Khan, Mustafa Agha and Zirar Agha. Although Rowanduz is non-tribal and is not bound to this or that chieftain, the townsmen took sides in the quarrel, mostly on that of Isma'il Beg, and the quarrel lingers on. The party of Muri Rawil Agha has now practically disappeared, and his son, Karim Agha, who resides in the town, does not dare approach the vicinity of Isma'il Beg's house from fear of further reprisal.

The vendetta has been one of the foremost features of Kurdish life for centuries, and, in spite of its toll in lives, has something of the aspect of a game or sport. Unless commoners or whole tribes are involved, most of

the casualties are sustained by the chieftains and their bodyguards, a sort of exchange of assassinations, and there is nothing which might be termed "total warfare." If a chieftain is engaged in a feud with another, he does not ordinarily try to kill off the other's peasantry or destroy their crops, but rather attempts the ambush of his adversary or that person's immediate relatives and followers. There are several examples to indicate that feuding parties do not like the idea of decisive contests. The causes of such conflicts are extremely varied, although women are said to be one of the most frequent, and are often trivial. The government, insisting on its own justice, has a great deal of trouble with these affairs, and, at the same time, has used them to its own advantage. One of the chief reasons for the failure of Kurdish revolts over the years has been the fact that the leaders are just as interested in the overthrow of each other as in that of the government. Mahmud Beg of the Baradost tribe performed welcome service in aiding the defeat of Mulla Mustafa's abortive rebellion, not because of his loyalty, which need not be questioned, but because of an old feud. It is interesting that certain persons treat their relations with the government in the same way, that is, as a matter between families, carrying on what might be classified as private vendettas with the authorities. If one's brother has been hung or imprisoned, the next step is the assassination of a policeman, not necessarily the

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constables who apprehended the culprit or the judge who pronounced sentence, but "any member of the government tribe." Quite a number of this last type of feud come to light from time to time, and in 1951 one "brigand" near Rania is credited with having disposed of numerous policemen, not primarily occupied with his capture, but engaged in their customary duties. 628● 648

Europeans or Americans are apt to lose sight of the deadly nature, sport or not, of the Kurdish vendetta, particularly, as is often the case nowadays, when it is coupled with politics. The investigator was seated one evening in the "club" in Rowanduz with Sayyid Ahmad of Betas, a son of Shayth Taha, and one of his bodyguards. Sayyid Ahmad was not directly concerned in the Rowanduz feud, but he was a regular guest of Lali Khan and his sympathies lay with the House of Isma'il Beg. It was interesting to notice that when Karim Agha, the son of Kuri Bawil Agha, and hence a possible enemy, entered the garden, Sayyid Ahmad quickly loosened the holster of his pistol and his follower automatically took up a strategic position behind the new visitor, leaning against a wall. On another evening, Sayyid Ahmad forbade, with some violence of expression, a well-meaning person who wished to accompany him across an exposed meadow with a lantern, again, a simple precaution. This atmosphere of violence is an everyday feature of life in Rowanduz, but it must be stressed that actual danger does not in any way extend to the common people nor, under normal circumstances, the 628

government personnel. It would be easy for an outsider to romanticize this situation, and this could not be far from wrong, for the Kurds do the same themselves. The chieftain is the summation of a peasant's ideals, a formidable warrior, unremitting in vengeance, generous in hospitality, and gallant in conduct. An aristocratic youth is educated to play this part. It would be difficult to find many peoples among whom the hero, so defined, has so extensive a daily role and so general and attentive an audience. A number of persons in the Rowanduz area, queried on this point, were unable to name more than one or two chieftains of the aristocratic group, perhaps two or three hundred men in all, who had not been imprisoned or exiled by the government at least once.

Safeguard, as in the case of revenge, is a matter of aristocratic honor. Formerly, anyone who wished to pass through a chieftain's territory was expected to put himself under the latter's protection, because, failing this, he became more or less fair game for bandits or, indeed, the chieftain himself. In past decades brigandage, like assassination, was something of a sport, and holding up a caravan was considered an amusing, as well as lucrative, occupation for the aristocracy. The luckless merchant could only apply to the chieftain for his goods which, in consideration of a fee, were "recovered" and returned to him. The easiest technique, of course, was to obtain right to passage at first, at the expense of a few gifts, and a number of the chieftain's men would be delegated as guards.

For the Kurds themselves, safeguard had a more important application. If a man was a member of a group engaged in a vendetta, and had to pass through dangerous territory, he could put himself under the protection of a neutral group whose men provided him with an escort and, should he be killed, was obligated to avenge his death just as if he had been one of its own. 484 579 628

Sanctuary is something of major importance among the Kurds. If a man had committed a crime, usually a murder, he could throw himself on the mercy of the nearest chieftain and the latter was bound by honor to protect him from his pursuers. Often the chieftain paid the bedalkhwin or blood-money to the injured parties, although unrelated to them or to the criminal, as a generous gesture. Of greater interest, perhaps, the chieftain provided sanctuary for runaway lovers. If a youth and a maiden fell in love and their parents forbade the match, they sometimes fled together, and, if captured by their irate relatives, would be slain. It is said that the first thing for such fugitives to do is to have intercourse, so they cannot be separated except by death, for a woman who has lost her virginity out of wedlock must be killed by her kinsman. If the pair were able to reach a chieftain, the latter now acted as a matchmaker. He sought out the parents of the girl, informed them that their daughter was under his protection, attempted to reconcile them to the marriage, by this time consummated, and often paid the dowry of the bride, again, as a matter 696 628 622 [583] 628 584 622 [684]

of generosity. Commoners are not in a position to quarrel with a chieftain, and the problem was usually solved in this way. The youth was summoned and kissed the hand of his reluctant father-in-law, addressing him as a parent. If, however, the fugitive couple belonged to aristocratic houses, the most sanguine of vendettas could follow. 622 628 584

The integrity of its women is perhaps the primary facet of a family's honor. If a Kurd insults anything other than the woman of his opponent, he is in danger of being slain himself. If, however, he seriously questions the honor of a woman, the latter must be killed by her relatives, never the accuser. The accusation is thus extremely dangerous, and, although it is sometimes heard in joking exchanges, a serious enunciation cannot be taken lightly. The honor of a man depends very much on that of his female relatives, and the primary rule in this second regard is that no woman, unmarried or married, can have unseemly traffic, specifically intercourse, with any other person than her husband. If a bride cannot demonstrate her virginity, she can be returned to her relatives who are obligated to slay her, although she is not thus sent to them in every case. Similarly, if there is an accusation of adultery, a wife can be directed to the same fate. The woman, it might be said, is always the offender. It follows that if a woman errs in this way and is detected, she must flee, either to a chieftain or 577 562 554 [684] [585] 684 562

to the great cities, and even in these places she feels far from secure. While this concept is common to families of any class of society, it reaches its apogee among those of the aristocracy. If the daughter of a commoner runs away, he may be unable or unwilling to do anything about it, but a chieftain, as the personification of his people's honor, is more or less bound to exact justice. Thus insulting the integrity of a noblewoman can also result in violence. 684 562 628 683 622

Finally, hospitality is a necessary concomitant of a chieftain's honor, and an ideal of all. "To be a chieftain," it was said, "a man must belong to a noble house, must be followed by armed men, and must have a guest-room." Hence the aristocratic houses maintain diwankhanas which very considerably in size and form according to their estates. In some cases it is only a few rooms within the house and in others a separate building. Some chieftains have large tents pitched as guest-rooms in the summer. In furnishings and service the aristocratic guest-room does not differ from that described in the preceding section, and the distinction between it and the diwankhana of, say, a wealthy merchant, is that it must always be open to strangers, no matter what their station in life. Strictly speaking, the rule of hospitality applies to any Kurdish house, but, outside of emergencies, its usual application is among the aristocrats. One of the functional aspects of the support of the chieftainship appears here. A poor villager cannot entertain a stranger in sumptuous fashion, 574 622 [342] [343]

is the concept of the inequality of male and female, the second held to be a necessary but weak and volatile component of the scheme of things. The Kurds, as suggested above, claim to hold their women in greater respect than the Arabs, but it is doubtful that this might be carried to the extent known in Europe or America without considerable opposition. In the agricultural villages of the district, the wives and daughters enjoy much greater social equality, inasmuch as they are partners with the men in working in the fields, than in Rowanduz, where the work of men, for example, the trade of the smith or the merchant, is considered impossible or shameful for females. It is thus that, although a man may be discomfitted by being known as cowardly, miserly, or impious, the two worst catastrophes that can overtake the honor of the mal are the murder of one of its members or the indiscretion of its women. In popular theory, the murderer or one of his relatives in the first case must be sought out and slain, and, in the second, the woman in question must be done away with.

The second thing necessary to notice is the almost incredible emphasis placed on a male heir. Every man, no matter what his station in life, desires a son, and, this wish granted, extends it to include a grandson. "A grandfather prays to God to let him live long enough to see his grandson," one was informed, and one of the most heartbreaking events is the death of a son or grandson. It has been noted how Ra'uf Effendi considered a second marriage

people for burial, to perform circumcision, to fire the gun for Ramadan, to play the tambourine, to assist at ceremonies of all sorts, and to help people. I can cure illnesses by my own medicines. I have now left everything in this world which is bad, and have started my prayers. 159 792 [767]

Sayyid Hesani, of whom Hajji Mustafa speaks above, was one of the most distinguished residents of Rowanduz, although not a native of the town. He died some years ago, and his house is still pointed out. Sayyid Hesani was not directly concerned in the feud between Nuri Bawil Agha and Isma'il Beg, although he was an adherent of the latter, but was closely bound up with Kurdish revolutionary activities. He was a writer, and operated the first Kurdish press in Iraq. The investigator possesses a postage stamp of the "Government of Southern Kurdistan," printed by Sayyid Hesani for the short-lived "state" of Shaykh Mahmud. Sayyid Hesani was engaged in a number of enterprises, some of them questionable from the government's point of view, and Hajji Mustafa, although he neglected to mention the fact, was one of his men. Hajji Mustafa also failed to relate how, during the second World War, he and several other adventurers procured police uniforms and levied customs duties from lorries going from Iran to Iraq at a point several miles in advance of the real customs station. The drivers were surprised to have to pay their tolls a second time and there was an investigation, but Hajji Mustafa escaped indictment. This exceptional man, who, in the course of his life, had been a barber, government employee, highwayman, itinerant trader, merchant, mukhtar, muleteer, owner of a tea-shop, 159 [628] [669] [205] [579] [651] 159 463

The most productive comparisons would be with the Turks or the Persians, but, unfortunately, no such monographs are as yet available. To utilize the scanty and widely scattered materials on Turkish or Persian life would be at best haphazard. This study of Rowanduz, with certain exceptions, stands by itself, in the belief that it will afford accurate data for the comparative treatments of the future.

Something of the content of Kurdish life, as observed in Rowanduz, has been presented. It has been seen that the town dominates, partly in an administrative and partly in a commercial way, a large agricultural district. The bulk of the townspeople are merchants, craftsmen, and servants who depend for their livelihood on commerce with the villagers and the patronage of government personnel. The basis of the town's importance is both economic and political. Life within the household, the structure of society, and religion have been treated. What is perhaps of great importance is the ample demonstration that the Kurds are not savages devoid of culture, that they are not all "robbers" and need not "kill six or seven men" in order to be respected. With the exception of revolts and blood feuds, the district is relatively peaceful and normally one is rarely in danger of molestation. The old brigandage, carried on largely by the chieftains as a lucrative diversion, was directed against commercial travelers who could protect themselves from it by the simple expedient of making "gifts" in advance. A district population of some fifty thousand

could scarcely support itself by robbery alone. It is interesting that the Arab Bedouins, among whom the vendetta and brigandage are just as well marked, are not often accused of being a race of savages and criminals. The Bedouin, unlike the Kurd, has been romanticized rather than condemned by those who have had little experience with him. Kurdish life, to be sure, is not distinguished by its intellectual or artistic achievements, but, by the same token, neither is that of Medieval Scotland, Sicily, or Albania, mountainous regions inhabited by peoples of a similar temperament. The most interesting characteristic of Kurdish culture is the way in which it has been moulded by Islam, and, in this, it exhibits similarities to that of Islamic peoples everywhere. It is mute testimony to the character of Islam and to the force of its protagonists in the Kurdish mountains that the peculiarities which may have obtained in pagan Kurdish society or religion have been so thoroughly submerged into a standard pattern. Aside from minor deviations, one is able to discover little which strikes him as strange or anomalous.

The second object of this study has been the delineation of the impact of the modern state on Kurdish life, and it is necessary to discuss the conclusions reached in this respect in much greater detail than in the first. The Kurds have been subjected, particularly since the Arab conquests, to rulers of one sort or another, the last of whom were the Ottoman Turks, but this control was, for the most part, superficial. Ottoman administration in Kurdistan

and larger confederations of kinship groups are articulated with a similar phraseology. The Kurdish tribe, which has not been extensively discussed, represents in large part such a unit. The lands of the tribe, agricultural or pastoral, are the property of kinship groups, extended patrilineal families, as are the flocks and herds, and an individual cannot alienate them in quantity without difficulty. Chieftainship is hereditary, commonly with the democratic approval of the men of the tribe. Some chieftains are undistinguished from their tribesmen save in the size of their families' holdings, and others receive a customary share of the annual produce. The Kurdish tribe, then, is traditionally an alliance of extended patrilineal families, sometimes with the fiction of a common ancestor, and membership in the tribe depends on membership in the family, a matter of "blood" descent. Tribal life is directed by the chieftain, and the murder of a member or the theft of property by an outsider is never permitted to go unavenged.

Feudalism, an arrangement different than that of the tribe, requires no redefinition here. It is a personal exchange of duties between landlord and tenant, and is not represented in the Rowanduz district by the nomads whose society is exclusively tribal. It seems to have arisen in two ways, in the first of which the chieftains of nomadic groups took agricultural villages under their protection. One might remark again that the nomad, because of his mobility and firepower, has a military advantage over the villager. In the second, some powerful families, by the

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

the Kurdish tribal system poses some unusual problems in this field. 621
In the travel literature, Kurdish tribes have a deserved reputation as [181]
warriors and bandits with little respect for human life, and without
further analysis of the situation it has been assumed that much of
their activities in this field is governed by a pattern of blood feuding.
There is however good reason to analyse the situation more carefully,
to discover just what patterns relating to homicide do in fact exist.

The material on which the following is based is, for obvious 628 •
reasons, very incomplete. Today homicide is the matter with which
the external administration is most concerned, and immediate inter-
vention on its part tends to prevent other action from being taken,
or fear of such intervention prevents actual case histories from
being discussed. All the data that I do have, however, indicates the
absence or very weak development of blood feuding patterns in
Southern Kurdistan. This absence may seem surprising, and it is
necessary to make clear just what is meant by the statement.

It seems useful in the analysis of this phenomenon to adhere to a
fairly specific defintion of what is meant by institutionalized blood
feud. In its most characteristic form, it has been described in nume-
rous African societies, e. g. the Nuba (Nadel 1947): «In Heiban
[homicide] entails blood feud, which is carried on until exact revenge
has been achieved; a man must be killed for a man, a woman for a
woman; even in their age the two must be as closely matched as
possible. The duty to avenge devolves, not on an individual, but on
the whole clan . . . . Again, the revenge is not directed against an
individual — the murderer himself — but against any member of
the enemy clan who satisfies the conditions of the law of rev-
enge . . .», p. 151). The pattern is thus a special form of institution-
alized revenge, whereby a whole group of persons is held collectively
responsible for the behavior of one of its members, and where the
wronged party is similarly not conceived as the individual or his
close family, but as the whole larger group to which he belonged.
The reaction is one of retaliation, governed by considerations of
equality, and subsidiarily one of compensation by traditionally stipu-
lated blood money (e. g. ibid. p. 251).

In this form, the blood feud is not found in Southern Kurdistan.

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

• 628 721 In fact, the basic principle underlying the institution, namely the collective responsibility of the members of the descent group, seems to be lacking. Where the descent group is in fact the local community, one is faced with the problem of deciding whether the group at any one time acts *qua* descent group or *qua* local, that is territorial, unit. To analyse the data relating to this, it is necessary to make a distinction between (1) such collective responsibiltiy relating to homicide, where a whole group is held responsible for the initial act of *one* member, and (2) the collective nature of other types of *feud and warfare*, where the whole group as a political unit is involved in the *initial* action — such as would be the case where a death resulted from any kind of organized and premeditated raid that one group might make upon another, with a primary interest in booty. If, in this latter case — though it might lead to retaliation — the retaliation were not governed by considerations of equality, it could not properly be called blood feud.

Incidents of type (2) have certainly been frequent in Southern Kurdistan. Incidents of type (1), on the other hand, did not come to my knowledge, either in historical material or on the contemporary scene. It would rather seem that a pattern of individual and particular *revenge* prevails, which extends only to very near kinsmen and accomplices. Certainly, the only case history which I can document fairly completely (see Appendix II) is appropriately described in such terms. In this pattern of revenge, the harm and retribution is definitely directed towards the person who committed the initial murder, only secondarily towards his nearest kinsmen, and that only if they have taken a clear stand in the conflict. There can be no feeling of collective responsibility within the whole descent group, since random retaliation within the lineage or even village of the offender is never considered. Conversely, only the very close kin of the deceased are motivated by the desire for revenge. The orphan would experience great difficulties in calling on lineage mates to assist him by virtue of their righteous indignation — he would do much better if he emphasized an economic motive, constituting himself as the leader of a small group of «bandits» in an attempt to rob his opponent. Thus, both in the case of homicide between

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

tirat and between sections of a single *tira*, the procedure seems to be one of personal revenge, and not retaliation within the whole group to which the offender belongs. It therefore seems useful to emphasize this difference by limiting the term blood feud to its typical form, as found e. g. among the Nuba, and to explore the possible reasons why the jural concepts of collective responsibility, on which the blood feud pattern is based, are *not* applied to a Kurdish lineage group or segment of such.

It is necessary to emphasize the unique situation, as compared to most societies described in the anthropological literature, in which these jural principles are to be applied. Kurdish lineages are not organized factions within a community, as is often the case in other societies; nor do they have the usual ramifying kinship connections with other groups. With a high frequency of close kin marriage, as described above, a Kurdish lineage, and even the lineage segments down to the village level, are endogamous, socially isolated units. They are, furthermore, geographically isolated. The *tira* as a whole occupies a large, contiguous territory; the members of the *tira* are essentially the sole residents of that territory. The local group, the village, is also the lineage segment. There is no indigenous political authority above the level of the maximal lineage; and such a maximal lineage has no vital relations with other groups (except a certain minimum of trade). The maximal lineage can therefore, in the autonomous Kurdish system, be regarded as «the society».

The concept of collective responsibility thus hardly applies in the usual sense in the relations between segments of *different* lineages —between groups in separate «societies». Jural principles of this type can only be applied *within* moderately homogeneous societies, where any individual as a sociological person is an approximate equivalent of his co-lineage mates. (Fortes 1953). With the geographical separation of Kurdish lineages, furthermore, feud between them would in fact necessitate aggression into «foreign» territory. The maximal lineage is a politically unified corporate group for purpose of defence, and thus conflicts on any scale between segments would lead directly to all-out war between the lineages to which they belonged. In such a situation, economic and other considerations favoring continued

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

peaceful relations would take precedence over the desire for personal revenge on the part of anyone but the most powerful leader. Personal conflicts between such leaders might well be patterned by the desire for revenge, and none the less involve whole groups in the conflict; but considerations of equality in retaliation would not be relevant on this ‹inter-societal› level, and blood feud is thus an inappropriate name for inter-tribal feuds, no matter what the immediate cause that ostensibly produced the feud were.

In a system with endogamous lineages, conflicts between subsections of a maximal lineage, of the type discussed in Appendix II, would seem to lend themselves more readily to solution by blood-feud. Whereas the individual's has few personal dealings with persons outside his *tira*, there is much room for disputes and conflicting claims *within* the endogamous, landholding *tira*. Such disputes would not immediately become ‹international› problems, subject to all the attendant tactical and practical considerations, but would create factions *within* the group, where concepts of justice and settlement be equality are more applicable. The only further prerequisite for a development of a blood feuding pattern is then a certain minimum strength of the kinship bonds, to ensure clear kinship alignment in the factions and near-universal identification with the kinship group and the action of kinsmen. This degree of development of the kinship bond seems to be lacking in Southern Kurdistan at the present time.

It should also be remembered that with the Kurdish type of lineage organization, the individual's loyalties are not to the descent group *in abstracto*, but are felt and expressed in terms of local groups, which very nearly correspond to the lineage segments. Because of this, any armed conflict between lineage segments will necessarily be in territoreal terms; it will be a feud between villages. Thus complicating factors enter, involving territorial interests in areas where there is no surplus of arable land (e. g. much Hamawand territory today), conquest and vassalization of villages, etc. The larger territorial organization of the whole lineage is directly endangered by such internal inter-*village* wars, and characteristically enough it is the function as arbitrator in intra-lineage conflicts that

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

the tribal leader retains longest in the face of breakdown of tribal organization (cf. Memmi, p. 126). The ability to avoid or resolve such conflicts between villages is a prerequisite for the maintenance of lineage unity, and it is therefore essential that the principle of collective responsibility is *not* applied to the co-residents of the village community.

Leach (op. cit., pp. 56-7) discusses a feud between two competing lineages in the Rowanduz area. Though in effect a struggle for political supremacy between rival lineages, it appears to be governed by ideas of retaliation and equality. Hay (op. cit.) further lists the traditionally stipulated blood money to be paid for various classes of people. The Rowanduz area, as contrasted to Southern Kurdistan, is one where a number of well-organized lineages are in close contact. This is due in part to a difference in local history. Sulaimani is an old center, and the whole territory was long subject to the feudal Baban administration, based on non-lineage principles. The Rowanduz mountain areas, on the other hand, retained a presumably characteristic tribal organization, with numerous territorially separate, independent lineages till quite late, when it was united by conquest in a larger state system under the Mir og Rowanduz around 1830. It is interesting to speculate whether the fusion of numerous lineages into a larger state may not have changed some of the factors outlined above in such a way as to permit the institutionalized extension of the South Kurdish pattern of personal revenge to a pattern of blood feud.

In Southern Kurdistan, it is difficult to see what sanctions would be brought to bear against homicide within the maximal lineage, other than this pattern of personal revenge. Other mechanisms, once existing, may however have been disguised by now through the activities of the external administration.

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

A person exhibiting similar virtues to a lesser degree will naturally tend to lead the local «rooftop society» of his own village, and is the type of person who frequently makes his career as the retainer of a feudal lord, thereby attaining elusive but probably considerable powers. 701 554

An occasional legitimate expression for this type of leadership today is the «posse», organized on a village level e. g. when cattle is stolen, on a larger scale when cooperating with the police in tracking a brigand. It should be noted, incidentally, that such assistance on the part of a whole district or tribe is only extended to the police when the outlaw has made himself obnoxious to the villagers of the area in question. 628 •

FaBrDa marriage pattern, the characteristics become meaningful, and the different function of kinship terminology in the Kurdish type of lineage organization and other types of lineages emerge:

Where a moderately consistent pattern of FaBrDa marriage and other close family endogamy is followed, the local, endogamous community becomes in fact the descent group. In the Kurdish system, these local descent groups are given names — in effect *village* names, which thus indicate both residence and descent, and thereby political affiliation. The corporate framework of the lineage is thus given directly in the named residence units, and kinship terms are unnecessary to further emphasize this corporate character. On the contrary, the terminology measures collateral distance, of considerable importance where relatives beyond a certain degree tend to form separate, endogamous sub-sections, disruptive to village unity and ultimately conducive to fission. Essentially, however, the kinship terminology is liberated from its functions in defining political units in the lineage system, and is utilized simply to describe relationship, possibly with a primary interest in inheritance. Here the effect of the complex Islamic law of inheritance may have been considerable — if it has in fact been appeals to [illegible] rather subtle ramifications.

A second modification of the usual pattern, concerned with law and the blood feud, would seem to follow from the combination of a lineage organization and preferential FaBrDa marriage. Fortes (1953) summarizes: «where the lineage is found as a corporate group, all the members of a lineage are to outsiders jurally equal and represent the lineage when they exercise legal and political rights and duties in relation to society at large. This is what underlies so-called collective responsibility in blood vengeance and self-help as among the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1940) and the Bedouin (Peters 1951).» On the background of this, the probable absence of weak development of collective responsibility and blood feud in Kurdish society might seem puzzling.

Where the lineage system is associated with a pattern of village endogamy, however, as in the Kurdish system, the maximal lineage becomes in effect «the society», not merely one organized group

within it. Thus the whole situation in which jural concepts are to be applied changes radically. No supra-lineage political authority is developed, and no interaction between a lineage and other groups is necessary, except for a certain minimum of trade. At the time of the present fieldwork, of course, and probably for most tribes in the area at most times in the last 300 years, the maximal lineages were in fact not totally independent. They were, however, subject to external administration, and that not consistently; and the indigenous social organization does not call for or lead to any supra-lineage integration. The concept of jural equivalence is thus meaningless as applied to a Kurdish maximal lineage; such a concept could only be relevant as applied within the lineage, between groups of recognized blood relation within the political unit. In this case, the disruptive effects of conflicts between what are in fact territorial groups within the unit prevent the extension of patterns of revenge to include larger collectivities than the immediate family, or a group of accomplices.

However, the lineage organization is only one type of social organization prevalent in the Kurdish area. With the breakdown of this regional organization there is primarily [illegible] more discreet groups, the integration of the separate, endogamous villages into larger political units poses a new problem. Non-tribal Kurdish social organization might be summarized as a system of hierarchical statuses, identified with particular individuals, and sanctioned by force more than anything else. This organization is then expanded into a larger, regional, semi-feudal system. This was at best a very labile structure, until frozen by the intervention of effective external administration which favored status quo. In the place of the regional displacement of lineage groups in large tribal districts, one finds an open web of relations between separate, endogamous, socially quite autonomous small villages. There form no natural larger units, except in purely physiographic or dialect terms. In this open web, feudal hierarchies might establish areas of influence, but until external administration imposed an arbitrary regional classification in terms of counties and districts, any areal units tended to be extremely fluid.

is reduced from one being given a fallow year. The same field can not be used as arable land for any longer period of time.

Essentially, then, the problem is one of choosing your fallow and choosing your grain crop. Since no other major crop is raised on this type of dry, non-irrigated land, any pattern of rotation is impossible. Cow dung, being a major source of fuel, is not available as fertilizer. The constant plowing, in addition to making the land able to absorb and retain the moisture of the winter rains, should also be useful in building up the humus by burying the weeds that develop.

APPENDIX B: A conflict involving revenge

• 6.26 The chain superimposition on an actual bloodfeud which I observed in progress was concerned with the rights to land, and involved a small lineage which finds itself split between the two villages Tsagah and Kani Lard, in Bimaworai territory. The wronged party being considerably more willing to discuss the situation, the following account may be slightly biased in their favor.

Two brothers, A and B, grandfathers of the present contenders, and both residents of the village of Tsagah, divided their father's land between them. A sold his field to a third person; B's son, Chetter, later bought it. A's son moved to the neighboring village of Kani Lard, where he worked as a landless laborer. Finally, A's grandson, Fatta, claimed the land back. Chetter, in possession of the land, expressed his willingness to sell; Fatta countered, saying that the crops of the past years were sufficient payment — a not uncommon argument. In the resulting quarrel, Fatta shot Chetter dead.

Kader, the son of Chetter, was then a very small boy, and Fatta was widely known as a competent citizen, so nothing was done. After killing one more person, unconnected with the present conflict, Fatta became an outlaw.

In the earlier unusual saving of an archaeological excavation, the orphaned Kader found himself working beside Lutif and Rashid from Kani Sard, the nephews and current relatives of Petro. This precipitated action on his part. Nothing was noticed for a brief period of work in the area belonging to the village of Kani Sard. When operations were transferred to Tangab's territory, Kader swore he would not stand for it, and promised to revenge his father. The two boys Lutif and Rashid were summarily chided, and were, upon their request, immediately removed from the site, and a settlement with the group of workmen from Tangab was later achieved, with some difficulty.

Later, Petro, who being an outlaw had little to lose, attempted to intimidate the villagers of Tangab by a further murder (a woman unrelated to Chanter and Kader), and by saving face to their grandchildren, in spite of the armed service the Tangabers had posted there. The people of Kani Sard, Petro's village, disavowed the fact, and disassociated themselves with the action by coming in paying it out. Since the law, they are accused of continually harming him in secret. Kader is still a young boy, and has sworn to revenge his father by killing Petro.

The essential points seem to be (1) Kader's revenge was transferred to the nephews of his father's murderer only because the murderer himself was out of reach, and because Kader, due to unprecedented circumstances, found himself working beside the nephews on the land of his own village — all a strong implied insult to his honour. (2) Kader did not receive active support in revenging his father, even though the father was, at the time of the murder, the Aghe of Tangab village. (3) The village of Kani Sard was able to disassociate itself from the acts of Petro — possibly because he did not belong to the senior lineage group of that village.

These points would indicate that an developed pattern of blood feud, as defined in the main body of the text, is operating and where patterns superficially similar to blood feud are found, these can better be explained as a slight extension of a strong pattern of individual revenge, or, in certain cases, a struggle between two lineages for political supremacy.

APPENDIX III: The education of a mullah.

The scholastic standards of the less village mullahs might be exemplified by a listing of the teachers and course of study of Mullah Said Mahmoud, now of the village of Dyukan. He was born in Sherkukan, and grew up in the village of Tapakwankare in the Rania valley between Sulaimani and Chamchamal. His religious traditions in the family, his interests were stimulated by the elder mullah brother of an ignorant. After having finished reading the Koran at the age of 9, and then forgotten it again, he decided to become a mullah at the age of 12. He finished the Koran again at 14, under the direction of his village mullah. He then travelled to Sulaimani, and studied

8: Leach E-S (1938) 1940 MAll Kurd MAll
Rowanduz

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The Nomads. In addition to the permanent settled inhabitants of the three areas here discussed there are certain nomadic groups who move seasonally from one area to another and even out of the district altogether. These nomads are again in many respects a distinct cultural group; their economy is based exclusively on pastoralism as opposed to the pastoral-agriculturalism of the settled peoples. The largest of the nomad tribes are the Berki. They are normally resident in Persia near the southernmost end of Lake Urmia. These high altitudes cannot provide sufficient fodder for their herds throughout the year and during the late autumn the bulk of the tribe migrates down the Rowanduz river and spreads out through the foothills (Area 3) and the northern fringe of the plains. They return to Persia with the melting of the snows in the late spring. I have no first hand evidence concerning these people and the second hand evidence appears to be both fabulous and contradictory. There is reason to think that their tribal organization at the present time functions more perfectly than that of the settled groups, presumably owing to less government interference. They possess definite grazing rights in certain areas, even in districts nominally under the control of settled groups' though in other areas they pay some sort of rental for the right to herd their flocks. Their migration is linked with important trade activities. They bring salt with them from Persia to Iraq, and take back wheat and barley. Wool is disposed of on the Erbil market as well as large numbers of their livestock. The duty-free import of salt is of course strictly illegal but is winked at by the authorities. It was reported in the summer of 1938 that the Persian authorities intended to compel the Berki to adopt a settled habitat. It is thus possible that this group in the political and economic organization ... the Kurdish area as a whole.

In my field work I stayed nearly all the time in villages occupied by members of the Surau and Balik tribes (see Map 2).

"The Iraq government authorities are able to carry on all negotiations with the Berki through the agency of a single paramount Agha, this despite the fact that the tribe itself scatters into small family groups throughout a very wide area; this seems to imply a high degree of tribal integration. During the summer of 1938 a law case was proceeding between the Agha paramount of the Berki and Jamil Agha of Baktila (Jaedi tribe) as to whether the former must pay any rent to the latter for the grazing rights of what appeared to be Berki land. Jamil Agha complained to me bitterly that the Berki seemed likely to win their case owing to their greater wealth and resources for corruption. The case however establishes the point that they might claim traditional grazing rights in land seemingly within the sphere of influence of permanently settled groups.

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MAll Kurd MAll
Rowanduz

CHAPTER 5

Warfare

Under present conditions large scale warlike activities on the part of the tribes are a complete impossibility, but that does not justify us in dismissing the topic of warfare altogether as being of no relevance to the present social situation. Historically speaking the political forms of Kurdish social organization are associated with an ideology of raids and counter raids, war, pillage and feud. Earlier writers have undoubtedly greatly exaggerated the extent to which the average Kurd in former times did in fact devote himself to murder, violence and loot, but in describing this preoccupation they were, after all, only accepting the Kurd at his own valuation. The Kurdish ideal of manly behaviour does correspond very closely with the typical British concept of a "brigand". His folk tales are gory in the extreme; his conversation hardly less so. And this has relevance to our existing situation. The Agha likes to think of himself as a military leader rather than as a landlord; he habitually classes all his neighbours into 'friends' and 'enemies'. The consequences of this attitude are highly subtle and cannot be examined here, but at least the divergent trends can be noted. On the one hand the sharp opposition between neighbouring groups is even today a force of social cohesion; the members of the clan or the tribe are aware of their unity largely in terms of their common enmity to some other group. On the other hand increasing economic contacts and the constant harmonizing efforts of the Police and the Administration, in so far as they are successful in lessening intergroup suspicion, do at the same time serve to loosen the social cohesion of the groups concerned.

While organized raiding or warfare is now impossible the private feud continues and may be examined further.

The Feud

The motif of the blood feud may be summarized by the phrase that "a man's wrongs must be avenged by his kinsfolk and his descendants", and we may note at once that a system of small patrilocal, nearly endogamous groups is peculiarly suited to perpetuate antagonisms of this kind. The individual's near kinsfolk are also his near neighbours, and since his wife's kinsfolk are probably identical with his own he is bound by no ties of loyalty to any group outside his own village. Within the village all are bound together to resist the aggressor, beyond it everyone is a potential enemy, the identity of interest between the family and the village is complete.

Quarrels between villages may arise from a variety of causes, chiefly economic. Water and grazing rights are always ill-defined and may lead to serious friction in times of scarcity, and this may

578 lead to one side burning the other's crops or stealing their cattle.
628 Until bloodshed has occurred nothing is serious and a good clan Agha will
684 see to it that the parties submit to arbitration before the affair
681 reaches a crisis. More serious are affairs in which women are involved; an insult to honour can only be wiped out by death and the discovery of adultery can have only one possible sequel. Such cases however need not necessarily lead to feud; if the guilty lover belongs to the same village as the injured husband a single murder is considered to settle the matter. If the parties are from different groups however the affair is much more serious and several assassinations may take place before settlement can be reached. Eventually, provided it is the honour of commoners rather than of Aghas that is at stake, the Agha concerned will arrange feud through the mediation of the tribal chiefs. According to Say "A blood feud is usually settled by the payment of blood-money; every condition of man or woman has his or her price, and even the parts of the body are catalogued. A Hamawnd or middle class Kurdish farmer is valued at £50, one of his women at £25, and his leg or arm at say £20. Such payment is often made in kind, some cattle or a horse, or so much wheat being handed over to the aggrieved party. It is very common for a girl to be given away in marriage in payment of blood money. Thus if £50 were owing, the price of the blood of one a n the debt might be paid by the delivery of one girl, three cows and a donkey". I have no comparable information, though I think the general principle is accurately described. In Say's time the Government could seldom apprehend a murderer. He says "For the murdered man's relations to take their revenge is quite in order, but an execution at the hands of that avenger, the Government, is an entirely different matter. The culprit therefore is carefully concealed until he can make good his escape to the hills". The position today is somewhat different and I fancy the murderer is usually caught. This however does not end the feud; blood feud murders are punishable only by two years imprisonment and the war starts again when the culprit gets free."

628 As has been explained the feuds of commoners and the less important Aghas are settled in the end by tribal arbitration. However

* The Administration makes a distinction between feud murders justified by tribal custom and ordinary murders which are not. The
628 former come under a special code for which the maximum penalty is two
684 years imprisonment; the latter come under the ordinary Iraq criminal code
178 for which the penalty is much more severe (? death). This has led an interesting repercussion. In the old days by tribal custom an affair of honour was adequately settled if the man only was killed, the woman in the case being merely driven out of her own community to fend for herself. Today it is necessary for the avenging husband to prove to the Authorities that it is really an affair of honour and not just a cold blooded murder. The custom now therefore is to kill both the guilty parties.

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nowadays the Government takes an active interest in the proceedings and by threat of dire and awful penalties is usually able to settle the affair near the start. Much more serious is a feud in which important tribal leaders are involved; here settlement is extremely difficult and assassinations may apparently continue for generations. One such major feud splits the Rowanduz district at the present time and has become so widespread that the contestants here assumed the scale and significance of political parties. Practically everyone I met seemed to be involved on one side or the other, some as active assassins, others, the majority, merely as intriguers. The term "my enemies" was clearly highly elastic; - so far as I could judge there was no particular distinction between mere political opponents and those one was prepared to assassinate. The allegiance of the more remote contestants is doubtless largely determined by kinship considerations, but this is not always obvious. A nephew of Hamid Agha of Dargala who had been shot in the back a year before was quite closely related to both of the principal contestant families; and there seemed to be no obvious reason why he should be campaigning on one side rather than the other.

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When this particular feud started is not clear, but it was already well established in 1918 and Hay mentions it a number of times; the most recent murder of the sequence occurred the day after I left Rowanduz. The murderer had come out of prison three days before, having been gaoled two years previously on account of an earlier assassination. My records on the subject are certainly very incomplete but even so they show a considerable casualty record:-

Descendants and Relatives of Hamil Agha - 5 dead, 2 wounded, 2 in prison.

Descendants and Relatives of Abdulla Pasha - 4 dead.

Today the affair has become entangled with all sorts of wider issues - Kurdish Nationalism in particular. Accusations of being pro-British, or pro-Arab, or anti-Kurd were levelled at all and sundry, and in the limited time available I had no chance to unravel all the complex of personal antagonisms and rival interests involved. Iraqi-Kurdistan however is now a part of Iraq and it was highly interesting to see how in this new political situation the old antagonisms were being re-aligned to cope with wider issues on a more impersonal front.

Religious Organisation

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Religion is not a subject that the investigator can gain much information on in his first preliminary survey, and my own studies in this field were particularly slender.

*Cf. the feud between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis in Palestine today.

34a Iranv 8-5 (no date) 1926 MAI Iran MAI
Kurd 1941
Baluchi 442.

This division, probably will not last long. The great famine and drought of 1916–1917 have greatly reduced the numbers of flocks, and the typhus and other epidemics have rendered many powerful tribes insignificant.

It is noticeable that a Khurasani Kurd differs in his physical structure from his kinsmen in the West, *i.e.* in the real Kurdistan, exactly as the Persian peasant of Khurasan differs from a western. The Khurasani Kurds are much taller and stronger, but their features are not so finely cut, and the facial angle is not as high as the one seen in the west. The Khurasani Kurds resemble Lurs more than the western Kurds in their physical type, although fair-haired individuals are much rarer amongst them.* They are a comparatively healthy race except in the vicinity of cities, where disease and opium smoking are frequent.

There is a great deal of unity between all these different tribes, and the feuds which are so common in Kurdistan proper apparently do not exist. Like all nomads, Kurds possess a greater national feeling than the settled Persians. There are apparently no great differences between the local idioms, and intercourse between tribes is very common; even intermarriage is very frequent.

The language of the Khurasani Kurds belongs to the so-called Northern or the real Kurdish family, and is connected with the dialect of the Mukris more than with any other known idiom. It has, however, several discrepancies from that original tongue. The Khurasani Kurdish is greatly influenced by the laws of the Khurasani Persian phonology. The vocabulary varies very much in different localities, and is either replete with Persian terms in the south, or with Turkish in the north. Many Kurdish families are bilingual, especially in the north, where they often speak better Turkish than Kurdish.

Baluchis.—This is another important tribe of Iranian origin living in Khurasan. They are nomads. Very rarely isolated families become settled, but in one or two generations they lose all connection with the Baluchis and become assimilated with the Persians. The Baluchis who extend their wanderings far to the north, live in the districts of Juwain, Nishapur, Turshiz, etc., and have already lost their original language. Further south their idiom resembles the original tongue, *i.e.* the Makrani dialect of Baluchi. Very little exact information about their language and folk-lore is available at present.

Physically Baluchis differ considerably from Persians and Kurds. They are usually much smaller, their features are not so regular, and their facial angle is often very sharp. They are an unsightly, lazy, apathetic people, although they possess much predatory spirit. Their seasonal [Customs records and sedentary ways of life.—Author]

* The impressions concerning this may not be correct, because the nobles dye their hair with henna and always keep the head covered. But it seems that in Kurdistan proper one sees more numerous fair-haired children than in Khurasan; in the West they may be mistaken for Europeans.